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I BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
) Appeal No. 930369-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a final judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit into 
evidence on relevance grounds two written buy-out proposals, each 
referring to compensation, and whether such error was prejudicial. 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this 
issue is a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
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781, n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991)1 
2. Whether the trial court erred in assessing Ferrin's 
claimed witness travel expenses as "costs." The applicable 
standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is an abuse 
of discretion standard. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 
2There is recent authority from the Utah Supreme Court 
suggesting the appropriate standard of review for the admission or 
exclusion of evidence is an abuse of discretion standard, not a 
correctness standard. Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P. 2d 1260, 
1262 (Utah 1993); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270, n. 11 
(Utah 1993); Also see, State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991), cert, den., 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). In Thurman, 
supra, the Court disavows certain of the standard of review 
language used in its earlier decision in State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 
774, 781, n. 3 (Utah 1991). However, in so doing, the Court 
observes that all standards of review involve questions of law, but 
that a correctness standard is not to be applied in "reviewing each 
such [admissibility] ruling," which suggests that some 
admissibility rulings are still subject to a correctness standard 
of review. 
At first glance, the Nay case would appear to stand for the 
proposition that the exclusion of evidence is subject to an abuse 
of discretion standard. However, the Nay case involved the 
exclusion of evidence based on Utah R. Evid. 403, which by its 
terms grants discretion to the trial court to determine whether 
evidence already deemed relevant should nevertheless be excluded. 
Here, the issue is whether the proffered evidence is relevant, 
which Romney submits is uniquely a question of law. For that 
reason, Romney believes that the Gonzalez case still states the 
applicable standard of review for a ruling on whether evidence is 
relevant (and therefore admissible). Nevertheless, Romney does njt 
wish to overemphasize the point because it his contention that 
whatever standard of review is applied, be it correctness or abuse 
of discretion, it is clear that the trial court erred when it 
determined that the subject buy-out proposals were not relevant. 
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(Utah 1980); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
-Utah R. Civ. P. 61 provides as follows: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the court to 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error 
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
-Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2) provides as follows: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
* * * 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent 
from the context within which the questions were 
asked. 
-Utah R. Evid. 401 provides as follows: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
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-Utah R. Evid. 402 provides as follows: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, 
or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts 
of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
-Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) (1992) provides as follows: 
(2) A witness attending from outside the state in 
a civil case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents 
per mile and is taxed for the distance actually and 
necessarily traveled inside the state in going only. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a dispute over compensation between an 
employer, appellant Keith B. Romney ("Romney"), and a former 
employee, appellee Brent A. Ferrin ("Ferrin"), regarding amounts 
Ferrin claims are owed to him pursuant to an alleged oral 
compensation agreement with Romney. Romney is the sole owner of 
Keith Romney Associates ("KRA"), a resort condominium and timeshare 
consulting firm. Ferrin was employed by KRA from August, 1986 
through May, 1990, when Ferrin voluntarily quit his employment at 
KRA in order to take a position with the Marriott Corporation. 
Ferrin brought this action because he contends that he har an 
oral compensation agreement with Romney which provides that he is 
entitled to a percentage share of all income earned by KRA while 
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Ferrin was employed at KRA, and that such percentage share is to 
be paid to him when the income is received by KRA, whether Ferrin 
is still employed at KRA or not. After Ferrin left KRA, KRA 
received certain income which Ferrin contends was earned by KRA 
before he left and that therefore he is entitled to a share of such 
income. Ferrin also contends that he is entitled to a percentage 
share of any income which may be received in the future by KRA if 
it was earned by KRA before he left. 
As his defense, Romney denies that he ever had such an 
agreement with Ferrin. Rather, Romney contends that the express 
oral compensation agreement of the parties is that Ferrin was 
entitled to a 25% share of all gross revenues actually received by 
KRA during the time Ferrin was employed at KRA, with certain 
exceptions, less certain expenses. However, once Ferrin left KRA, 
Ferrin's entitlement to any compensation from KRA ended. Romney 
further contends that there was no meeting of the minds of the 
parties or manifestation of mutual assent to the oral agreement 
which Ferrin claims exists, and that nothing Romney either said or 
did could have led Ferrin to believe that such an agreement 
existed. Moreover, Romney contends that the income KRA received 
after Ferrin quit was not earned by KRA before he left, so Ferrin 
would not be entitled to receive a share of such KRA income in any 
event. 
-5-
In addition, Romney asserted three counterclaims against 
Ferrin, each arising out of breaches of the duty of loyalty and/or 
the fiduciary duty Romney contends Ferrin owed to him as Ferrin's 
employer: (1) while Ferrin was employed at KRA and at KRA expense, 
and against Romneyfs specific instructions after he first learned 
of Ferrin's actions, Ferrin secretly attempted to sell to KRA 
clients and prospective KRA clients a deficient computer software 
program he had helped to develop; (2) While Ferrin was employed 
at KRA and at KRA expense, Ferrin secretly attempted to induce a 
KRA client to breach its contract with KRA and to enter into a 
separate consulting agreement with Ferrin; and (3) While Ferrin was 
employed at KRA and at KRA expense, Ferrin secretly negotiated his 
own employment with the Marriott Corporation at the same time 
Romney had asked Ferrin to negotiate a consulting contract with 
Marriott on behalf of KRA. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The case was tried to a jury commencing on January 25, 1993 
and continued through January 28, 1993. On cross examination of 
Ferrin, the trial court refused to allow into evidence two written 
buy-out proposals for KRA, which Romney's counsel proffered to the 
court were either authored by Ferrin or were prepared with Ferrin's 
input, and had been given to Romney by Ferrin while Ferrin was 
still employed at KRA. Each proposal directly referred to the 
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issue of compensation. One of the proposals, Romneyfs Exhibit 58, 
set forth precisely what Romney contends was the true understanding 
between Romney and Ferrin regarding Ferrin's compensation, which 
was that if Ferrin's employment terminated, Ferrin's entitlement 
to compensation from KRA would end. 
The other written buy-out proposal, Romney's Exhibit 57, 
provided what would happen to Romney's compensation in the event 
Romney was either terminated or quit KRA after Ferrin had completed 
his proposed purchase of KRA. In that proposal, Ferrin had 
carefully provided that Romney!s entitlement to compensation would 
end at termination of employment. Romney contends this also 
evidences the true understanding of the parties that Ferrin's 
entitlement to compensation from KRA would also end at termination 
of employment. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court dismissed Romney's second and third 
counterclaims at the close of Romney's case and only allowed 
Romney's first counterclaim to go to the jury. Pursuant to a 
special verdict form, the jury found that Ferrin was entitled to 
a share of the monies received by KRA after Ferrin quit in the 
amount of $102,681.42. The jury further found that Ferrin is 
entitled to a 20% share of income received, if any, by KRA in the 
future relating to certain KRA contracts. On Romney!s first 
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counterclaim, the jury found that Ferrin had breached his duty of 
loyalty to Romney, but found that Romney had not been damaged 
thereby. 
After the jury's verdict, but before the entry of judgment, 
Romney objected to certain witness travel expenses Ferrin sought 
to have reimbursed as "costs" in the case, including airfare, 
meals, taxi, lodging, etc. The trial court assessed the costs 
against Romney as requested by Ferrin. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Defendant and appellant Keith B. Romney ("Romney") is the 
sole proprietor of Keith Romney Associates ("KRA"), a condominium 
development and timeshare consulting firm based in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (Transcript, Day 2, pp. 167-168; Record, p. 2). 
2. KRA provides consulting services to developers and others 
on all aspects of condominium development, including the marketing 
of the project, sales staff organization, tax consequences, legal 
documentation, maintenance fees, financing, etc. (Transcript, Day 
1, pp. 93-94). 
3. Plaintiff and appellee Brent A. Ferrin ("Ferrin") was 
employed by KRA from August, 1986 through approximately May 1, 
1990, when Ferrin voluntarily quit his job at KRA in order to take 
a position with the Marriott Corporation. (Record, pp. 3-4; 
Transcript, Day 1, pp. 87, 94, 107-108; Transcript, Day 3, pp. 64-
66, 70-71, 100-103). 
4. Ferrin, who had a background in condominium sales and 
marketing, was hired by Romney specifically to assist in business 
cultivation for KRA, as well as to assist Romney in the servicing 
of KRA clients. (Transcript, Day 1, pp. 88-90, 94-95; Transcript, 
Day 3, pp. 24-26). 
5. At trial, Ferrin testified that with regard to his 
compensation at KRA, instead of being paid a salary, he had an oral 
agreement with Romney which provided he would initially receive 50% 
of "all the funds" that came into KRA. (Transcript, Day 1, pp. 
100-102). 
6. Ferrin testified further that such percentage share was 
later reduced to 30%, then eventually to 25%, where it stood at the 
time he left KRA. (Transcript, Day 1, pp. 102-103, 164). 
7. Romney testified that, prior to Ferrinfs joining KRA, he 
met with Ferrin on August 7, 1986 and agreed orally to pay him 50% 
of "new receipts," which Romney testified meant "new business that 
would come in after [Ferrin] came on board, new receipts of that." 
(Transcript, Day 3, p. 21). 
8. As Ferrin had testified, Romney also stated that Ferrinfs 
percentage share was later to be reduced. Specifically, Romney 
testified: 
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The agreement was that less certain business cultivation 
expenses, that [Ferrin] would be paid a percentage of the new 
receipts on new business that came in, exclusive of existing 
business, and that this would continue, as indicated, until 
the end of the year, and at that time we would then make a 
determination of what it would be from then on. (Transcript, 
Day 3, p.22) . 
9. With respect to Ferrin!s entitlement to compensation from 
KRA after termination of employment, Romney testified "I told him 
[during the August 7, 1986 meeting] that I would pay [Ferrin] as 
long as he was at KRA. I told him that I would pay him until he 
left KRA." (Transcript, Day 3, p. 23). 
10. Ferrin, on the other hand, without testifying that Romney 
ever actually told him that he would continue to pay him after he 
quit KRA, testified that "our agreement was that I was entitled to 
the money when KRA was entitled to it, and I was paid the money 
when KRA received the money. And so until it was received, then 
I didn't get my share." (Transcript, Day 1, p. 104; also see, 
Transcript, Day 1, pp. 100-104, 109-113, 164; Transcript, Day 2, 
pp. 52-54; Ferrinfs Exhibit 10; in addition, see Record, pp. 408-
437 for how Ferrin contends Romney!s "agreement" to pay Ferrin 
after he quit could have come into being). 
11. With regard to what happens to Ferrin*s entitlement to 
compensation if Ferrin left KRA, Ferrin1s counsel summarized 
Ferrin's contention as follows: "[a]nd the fact that Mr. Ferrin was 
no longer with him [KRA] meant nothing, because they'd [KRA] 
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already earned it . • . It was just a matter of waiting until it 
[the KRA revenue allegedly earned before Ferrin quit] showed up . 
. . " (Transcript, Day 1, p.73). 
12. And in closing argument, Ferrin*s counsel again 
summarized the "deal" as being: "You know, it's sort of like you 
work to the end of the month, but if you're not there on the 5th 
when the check comes out, you don't get it. That's exactly the 
same situation we have here. [Ferrin] earned it, he's entitled to 
it." (Transcript, Day 4, pp. 22-23). 
13. On that fundamental issue, entitlement to compensation 
after termination of employment, Romney attempted to offer into 
evidence during the cross examination of Ferrin two unsigned 
written buy-out proposals for KRA Ferrin had given to Romney, each 
of which spoke to the precise issue of Ferrin's entitlement to 
compensation from KRA after termination of employment, the subject 
matter of the lawsuit. (Transcript, Day 2, pp. 57-59, 82-89, 103-
104; Romney's Exhibits 57 and 58).2 
14. The first of these written buy-out proposals, a document 
in Ferrinfs handwriting dated February 18, 1989, and marked as 
Romney's Exhibit 57, contains a paragraph referencing what Ferrin 
2The pages of the trial transcript where these documents were 
identified, offered, and rejected are attached hereto as Attachment 
"A." 
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proposed would happen to Romney's compensation after Ferrin had 
purchased KRA. In paragraph 7, Ferrin provided: 
[Romney] will be compensated for his actions as an 
associate of KRA by receiving 20% of the income to KRA 
net of BC expenses. Plus he will receive incentive 
bonuses based on exceptional performance. If KBR 
fRomney 1 leaves KRA on his own or is terminated the above 
mentioned 20% payments shall cease. (Romney1s Exhibit 
5 7, Emphas i s added).3 
15. The second written buy-out proposal, marked as Romney's 
Exhibit 58, and dated February, 1990, just a few months prior to 
the date Ferrin announced his departure from KRA, had attached to 
it an unsigned "Purchase Option and Employment Agreement." The 
directly relevant portion of that document reads: 
[Romney] and [Ferrin] agree to the following re: 
Employment Agreement of [Ferrin]: 
1. Until TFerrin] purchases KRA or is terminated, 
[Romney] agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to 
twenty-five percent (25%) of all income received by KRA 
less any unreimbursed business cultivation expenses (the 
same method of determination used to date). (Romney's 
Exhibit 58, emphasis added).4 
16. Earlier in the case, the trial court had been provided 
copies of and had reviewed both of these documents in connection 
3A copy of Romney fs Exhibit 57 is attached hereto as 
Attachment "B." Romney's Exhibit 57 is identical to Fern fs 
Exhibit 3, which Romney!s counsel, as reflected in the transcri :, 
actually offered into evidence when the trial court pointed it 
that the document had already been marked. 
4A copy of Romney fs Exhibit 58 is attached hereto as 
Attachment "C." 
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with a summary judgment motion filed by Romney. (Transcript of All 
Pretrial Hearings, Hearing on Motion For Summary Judgment; Record, 
pp. 304-403, 408-437, 438-464). 
17. At trial, the court decided to reserve a ruling on 
Romney!s Exhibit 57 (Ferrinfs Exhibit 3) when it was first offered, 
(Transcript, Day 2, pp. 57-59), and then after hearing the 
arguments of counsel, decided not to rule on the admissibility of 
the document but to proceed instead on a "question by answer basis" 
with respect to that exhibit. (Transcript, Day 2, pp. 82-84). 
18. With respect to Romney's Exhibit 58, after argument, the 
court lfperceive[d] [it] to be irrelevant" and decided not "to allow 
its use as an exhibit at this point, absent further showing of 
relevancy," but did indicate that counsel could ask Ferrin about 
"whether his understanding of compensation was consistent with 
[Romney1s Exhibit 58] . . . " (Transcript, Day 2, pp. 84-89). 
19. Later, when counsel attempted to pursue a line of 
questioning with Ferrin on a "question by answer basis" on Romneyfs 
Exhibit 57, counsel was stopped by the court, who ruled at that 
time the document was "irrelevant." (Transcript, Day 2, pp. 103-
104). 
20. Counsel then handed Romney1s Exhibit 58 to Ferrin in 
order to question Ferrin about his understanding of the document 
but was again stopped by the court, who indicated that her ruling 
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on relevancy applied to Romney's Exhibit 58 as well, and thus 
neither document was admitted into evidence. (Transcript, Day 2, 
pp. 104-105). 
21. After the jury rendered its verdict as described above, 
Ferrin sought to have $1,142.95 in witness "travel expenses" 
assessed as "costs" in the case. (Record, pp. 708-709). The 
objectionable travel expenses requested included $591.88 airfare 
for witness Jim Vernes, $77.50 lodging for Mr. Vernes, $26.00 taxi 
fare for Mr. Vernes, $248.00 transportation for witness Bruce 
Maclntire, and $150.57 in "food11 for unspecified persons, 
presumably just the witnesses. (Record, pp. 716-719). 
22. Romney filed a motion to have costs taxed by the Court 
in accordance with the law, (Record, pp. 710-715), and responded 
further by letter, (Record, p. 727), but the Court assessed the 
"costs" as requested by Ferrin. (Record, pp. 725-726, 728-732).5 
5Attached hereto as Attachment "D" are copies of all < f the 
relevant portions of the Record on this issue, which in lucre 
Ferrin's original memorandum of costs, Romney's motion to have 
costs taxed by the Court, Ferrin!s amended memorandum of coses, a 
letter from Romney's counsel to the trial court, and a minute 
entry. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Erred When it Excluded From Evidence 
the Two Written Buy-Out Proposals and Such Error 
Was Prejudicial to Romney 
The trial court erred when it ruled that Romneyfs Exhibits 57 
and 58 were not relevant to the case and therefore not admissible, 
and such error was harmful and prejudicial to Romney. Whether 
evidence is "relevant/1 and therefore admissible, is a question of 
law, subject to review for correctness on appeal. State v. 
Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).6 A document is 
"relevant" if it has " . . . any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Utah R. Evid. 401. If a document is relevant, it is admissible. 
Utah R. Evid. 402. 
Nevertheless, a trial court's error in excluding evidence does 
not result in reversible error unless the error is "harmful." 
State v. Villarreal, 1993 WL 286661 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "An 
error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high as to undermine [the appellate court's] 
confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 
789, 796 (Utah 1991). There must be a "reasonable likelihood that 
6See footnote 1, supra, under the Statement of Issues section 
for a discussion on the applicable standard of review. 
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the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
Both documents were clearly relevant to Romney's case. In 
Romney!s Exhibit 58, dated February, 1990, there is a section of 
the exhibit which states what the agreement of the parties had been 
"to date" with respect to compensation, the most basic "fact of 
consequence" in the case. Under the heading "Purchase Option and 
Employment Agreement," the following language appears: 
1. Until rFerrin] purchases KRA or is terminated, 
[Romney] agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to 
twenty-five percent (25%) of all income received by KRA 
less any unreimbursed business cultivation expenses (the 
same method of determination used to date). (Romney's 
Exhibit 58, emphasis added). 
Romney contends that language is a statement by Ferrin 
indicating what his understanding of the agreement had been "to 
date," and such understanding was different from Ferrin1s position 
at trial and consistent with Romney1s position at trial. Romney 
proffered to the court that this document was prepared by Ferrin!s 
attorney, with Ferrin's input, and surely Ferrin!s attorney did not 
know what the agreement had been "to date" unless Ferrin had told 
him. Admission of this document would have made it "more probable" 
that the jury would have concluded the facts related by Romney 
regarding compensation were true, and "less probable" that the jury 
would have concluded the facts related by Ferrin were true because 
the document plainly supports Romneyfs testimony. 
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As for Romney's Exhibit 57, entitled "KRA Buyout Outline," 
dated February 18, 1989, and in Ferrin's own handwriting, the key 
portion of that document provides: 
7) [Romney] will be compensated for his actions as an 
associate of KRA by receiving 20% of the income to KRA 
net of [business cultivation] expenses. Plus he will 
receive bonuses based on exceptional performance. If 
rRomney] leaves KRA on his own or is terminated the above 
mentioned 20% payments shall cease. (Exhibit 3, 
paragraph 7, emphasis added). 
While this language deals with the issue of what would have 
happened to Romney's compensation if Ferrin had purchased KRA and 
Romney had thereafter decided to quit or was fired, the effect of 
this exhibit on Ferrin's case would have been devastating because 
the language contradicts Ferrin's assertion at trial that as long 
as any income received by KRA after he left was earned by KRA 
before he quit, he was "entitled" to his percentage share of it. 
Romney's Exhibit 57, in Ferrin's handwriting, is completely 
inconsistent with that position. What makes it so powerful is that 
Ferrin himself was careful to provide that if Romney were to quit 
KRA voluntarily after Ferrin purchased it, Romney!s entitlement to 
compensation would end. What Ferrin says Romney essentially agreed 
to orally, Ferrin was unwilling to agree to if the roles were 
reversed and Ferrin were Romney's employer . . . 
Admission of this document would have made it "more probable" 
that the jury would have concluded the facts related by Romney 
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concerning Ferrin's entitlement to compensation after termination 
from KRA were true, and "less probable" that the jury would have 
concluded the facts related by Ferrin on that "fact of consequence" 
were true. 
Both of these documents would have served as evidence in 
Romney1s direct examination, because he would have been able to 
present more persuasive evidence on the fundamental "fact of 
consequence to the determination of the action," i.e., the 
existence of the "agreement" alleged by Ferrin, and it also would 
have had a devastating effect on cross examination of Ferrin since 
both documents were so at odds with what Ferrin testified to at 
trial. Thus, the trial court erred in finding Romney's Exhibits 
57 and 58 were not relevant to the case. 
The trial court's determination that these documents were not 
relevant was harmful to Romney and affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. Ferrin alleged an oral agreement existed. Oral 
agreements are elusive of proof, and thus any evidence tending to 
either confirm or deny the existence of the agreement was vitally 
important to the case. 
Even more importantly, Ferrin did not testify that Romney ever 
actually told Ferrin that he would continue to pay him a share of 
KRA revenue if Ferrin were to quit KRA. Rather, Ferrin1s assertion 
was, and the jury presumably rendered their verdict based thereon, 
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that Romneyfs "agreement" to that proposition could "be inferred 
from the conduct of the parties, their statements, and dealings 
together." 
Where the existence of the alleged oral agreement was not 
based upon the actual verbal agreement of Romney, but instead was 
based upon "the totality of the circumstances," there can be no 
doubt that it was reversible error to deny Romney the opportunity 
to present his own evidence on "the totality of the circumstances," 
and "the conduct of the parties, their statements, and dealings 
together." The two-buy out proposals were unquestionably part of 
"the totality of the circumstances" between the parties. Moreover, 
each proposal spoke directly to the issue of entitlement to 
compensation after termination of employment, the most crucial 
issue of the lawsuit. The exclusion of these two documents creates 
a "reasonable likelihood" that the trial courtfs error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings. Consequently, it is clear that this 
Court's confidence in the verdict should be undermined. 
B. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Taxed 
as "Costs" the Witness Travel Expenses Submitted by Ferrin 
The trial court abused its discretion in taxing as "costs" 
the witness travel expenses claimed by Ferrin in his amended 
memorandum of costs. A trial court "can exercise reasonable 
discretion in regard to the allowance of costs," but still "has a 
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duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing 
thereof." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 (Utah 1980). 
"Costs" are "those fees which are required to be paid to the 
court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be 
included in the judgment." Frampton, supra, at p. 774; Morgan v. 
Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Utah, the 
statutes authorize fees of 25 cents per mile "traveled inside the 
state in going only" for witnesses travelling from outside the 
state. Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) (1992). 
In his amended memorandum of costs, Ferrin claimed $1,142.95 
of "costs" for the "travel expenses" of two out of state witnesses. 
The requested travel expenses included entries for airfare, 
lodging, taxi, transportation, and food. None of the travel 
expenses claimed are authorized by Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2). In 
fact, some of the same types of travel expenses were rejected as 
"costs" by the Utah Court of Appeals in Morgan, supra, at p. 687. 
In that case, the court refused, for example, to allow as "costs" 
a "business meal" and "local travel" because they were "not 
provided for by statute." That eliminates the "food" and "taxi" 
portions of Ferrin's request. 
Still, limited taxing of travel expenses, at the rate of 25 
cents per mile "traveled inside the state in going only," is 
authorized by Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2). However, the statute does 
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not authorize "airfare/1 "lodging,I! or unspecified 
"transportation." Consequently, the balance of Ferrin's requested 
travel expenses cannot be taxed as costs either since they are not 
authorized by statute. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
ROMNEY'S EXHIBIT 57 AND ROMNEY'S EXHIBIT 58 
INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE BOTH EXHIBITS ARE 
CLEARLY RELEVANT TO THE CASE 
The trial court erred in refusing to admit Romneyfs Exhibit 
57 and Romney's Exhibit 58 into evidence because both documents are 
clearly relevant to the case. Whether evidence is "relevant," and 
therefore admissible, is a question of law, subject to review for 
correctness on appeal. State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 704 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991).7 A document is "relevant" if it has ". . . any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. If a document 
is relevant, it is admissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. 
7See footnote 1, supra, under the Statement of Issues section 
for a discussion on the applicable standard of review. 
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Both documents were relevant to Romney's defense of the case, 
and were also crucial for his cross examination of Ferrin, because 
each of the documents dealt with the key issue of what happens to 
compensation after termination of employment from KRA, the most 
basic issue of the entire lawsuit. Both documents were relevant 
because they had at least a "tendency" to make the version of the 
oral compensation agreement asserted by Romney "more probable" and 
the version of the agreement asserted by Ferrin to be "less 
probable." 
The central "fact of consequence to the determination of the 
action" which the jury was called upon to decide in this case was 
the question: Did Romney, either expressly, by implication, or by 
conduct, ever agree to continue to pay Ferrin a percentage share 
of KRA revenue even if Ferrin were to quit KRA. Of all the issues 
the jury was expected to decide, no issue was of greater 
"consequence to the determination of the action." All other 
issues, such as whether any portion cf the income received by KRA 
after Ferrin quit was earned by KRA before Ferrin left, about which 
an inordinate amount of confusing testimony was offered at rial, 
paled in comparison to, and were subordinate to, that key 1 ^ ue. 
In the case of Romney!s Exhibit 58, dated February, j ^ 0, 
which is just a few months prior to the date Ferrin announced lis 
departure from KRA, there is a section of the exhibit wh-ch 
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actually states what the agreement of the parties was with regards 
to compensation. Under the title "Purchase Option and Employment 
Agreement," the following crucial language appears: 
[Romney] and [Ferrin] agree to the following re: Employment 
Agreement of [Ferrin]: 
1. Until TFerrin] purchases KRA or is terminated, [Romney] 
agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to twenty-five percent 
(25%) of all income received by KRA less any unreimbursed 
business cultivation expenses (the same method of 
determination used to date). (Romney's Exhibit 58, emphasis 
added). 
That section is completely consistent with Romneyfs position at 
trial, but directly contrary to the trial testimony of Ferrin. 
Counsel proffered to the court that Romneyfs Exhibit 58 was 
prepared by Ferrin's attorney with Ferrin's input, and was 
presented to Romney by Ferrin in a failed attempt to purchase KRA. 
It was a statement by Ferrin indicating what his understanding of 
the agreement had been "to date," and such understanding was 
different from Ferrin's position at trial. Whether Ferrin actually 
ever signed the document or not, it contained his representation 
of what the agreement had been "to date." Had Romney's counsel 
been allowed to do so, he would have questioned Ferrin in detail 
regarding the origin of the document and particularly the 
parenthetical representation in the document of what the agreement 
had been "to date." Surely Ferrin's attorney did not know what the 
agreement had been "to date" unless Ferrin had told him so. 
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It would have been devastating to Ferrin at trial had the 
document been admitted and had counsel been allowed to cross 
examine Ferrin fully concerning it. Admission of this document 
would have both made it "more probable" that the jury would have 
concluded the facts related by Romney concerning Ferrin's 
entitlement to compensation after termination from KRA were true, 
and "less probable" that the jury would have concluded the facts 
related by Ferrin on that issue were true because the document 
plainly supports Romney's testimony. Romney's Exhibit 58 was 
therefore relevant and should have been admitted as evidence at 
trial. 
The same is true of Romney!s Exhibit 57. This document, 
entitled "KRA Buyout Outline," and dated February 18, 1989, is in 
Ferrin1s own handwriting. The key portion of this document 
provides as follows: 
7) [Romney] will be compensated for his actions as an 
associate of KRA by receiving 20% of the income to KRA 
net of [business cultivation] expenses. Plus he will 
receive bonuses based on exceptional performance. If 
rRomney] leaves KRA on his own or is terminated the above 
mentioned 20% payments shall cease. (Exhibit 3, 
paragraph 7, emphasis added). 
While this language deals with the issue of what woul. have 
happened to Romneyf s compensation if Ferrin had purchased KF and 
Romney had thereafter decided to quit or was fired, the effect of 
this exhibit on Ferrin1s case would have been equally devastating. 
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It would have been devastating because the foregoing language 
contradicts Ferrin's assertion at trial that it did not matter for 
purposes of compensation, under his alleged oral agreement with 
Romney, if he still worked at KRA, as long as any income received 
by KRA after he left was earned by KRA before he quit. If the 
income received by KRA was earned before he quit, regardless of 
when it was actually received by KRA, he was "entitled" to his 
percentage share of it, or so Ferrin argued to the jury. (See 
Statement of Facts, paragraphs 10-12). 
Romneyfs Exhibit 57, in Ferrin's own handwriting, is 
completely inconsistent with that position. Ferrin himself was 
careful to provide that if Romney were to quit KRA voluntarily, or 
even if Romney were to be fired, Romney's entitlement to 
compensation would cease at that point. In other words, what 
Ferrin says Romney essentially agreed to orally when Romney agreed 
to pay Ferrin on a percentage basis, Ferrin himself was absolutely 
unwilling to agree to if the roles were reversed and Ferrin were 
Romney1s employer . . . 
Admission of this document would have both made it "more 
probable" that the jury would have concluded the facts related by 
Romney concerning Ferrinfs entitlement to compensation after 
termination from KRA were true, and "less probable" that the jury 
would have concluded the facts related by Ferrin on that "fact of 
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consequence to the determination of the action,! were true. 
Consequently, Romney's Exhibit 57 was also plainly relevant to the 
case. 
Admission of these two documents 1) would have damaged 
Ferrin's credibility in the eyes of the jury given his contrary 
testimony at trial, 2) would have served as evidence in Romney!s 
direct examination as Romney would have been able to fully explain 
the facts and circumstances surrounding these provisions and 
therefore would have better been able to present evidence on the 
fundamental "fact of consequence to the determination of the 
action," and 3) would have had a devastating effect on cross 
examination of Ferrin since both documents were so fundamentally 
at odds with what Ferrin was espousing at trial. For the foregoing 
reasons, Romney contends the trial court erred in finding Romney1s 
Exhibits 57 and 58 were not relevant to the case. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
ROMNEY'S EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 INTO EVIDENCE 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE ROMNEY 
WAS PREJUDICED AS A RESULT 
The trial court's error in excluding Romney1s Exhibits 57 and 
58 from being admitted into evidence prejudiced Romney and 
therefore constitutes reversible error. A trial court's error in 
excluding evidence does not result in reversible error unless the 
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error is "harmful." State v. Villarreal, 1993 WL 286661 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993); also, see, Utah R. Civ. P. 61 and Utah R. Evid. 103(a). 
"An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome 
is sufficiently high as to undermine [the appellate court's] 
confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 
789, 796 (Utah 1991). Put another way, there must be a "reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
Without question, the trial court's erroneous determination 
that these two documents were not relevant to the case was harmful 
to Romney and affected the outcome of the proceedings. In the 
first place, Ferrin alleged an oral agreement existed. Oral 
agreements are by their nature elusive of proof, and thus any 
documentary evidence tending to either confirm or deny the 
existence of the alleged agreement was vitally important to the 
case. In fact, of all the documents admitted at trial, only one 
document even arguably spoke to the issue of whether Ferrin would 
still be entitled to be paid after quitting KRA, and that was 
Ferrinfs Exhibit 10. Yet even that document, Ferrin admitted, 
"doesn't say those exact words." (Transcript, Day 2, p. 54). That 
is because the document was allegedly signed by Romney at a time 
when Ferrin was still working at KRA and when Romney had no idea 
that Ferrin was contemplating leaving. (Transcript, Day 2, pp. 52-
-27-
54). These two documents, on the other hand, either authored by 
Ferrin himself or by his attorney with Ferrin!s input, did "say 
those exact words." 
Even more importantly, with respect to the particular oral 
agreement alleged by Ferrin, Ferrin could not, and therefore did 
not, testify that Romney ever actually told Ferrin that he would 
continue to pay him a share of KRA revenue if Ferrin were to quit 
KRA. Rather, Ferrin1s assertion was, and the jury presumably 
rendered their verdict based thereon, that Romney's "agreement" to 
that proposition could "be inferred from the conduct of the 
parties, their statements, and dealings together." (Instruction 
No. 16, Record, p. 679; also see, Ferrin!s memorandum in opposition 
to Romneyfs motion for summary judgment for a more complete 
explanation of Ferrin1s contentions in this regard. Record, pp. 
408-437). 
Where the existence of the alleged oral agreement was not 
based upon the actual verbal agreement of Romney, but instead was 
based upon "the totality of the circumstances," there can be no 
doubt that it was reversible error to deny Romney the opportunity 
to present his own evidence on "the totality of the circumstances," 
and "the conduct of the parties, their statements, and dealings 
together." The two-buy out proposals were unquestionably part of 
"the totality of the circumstances" between the parties. Moreover, 
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each proposal spoke directly to the issue of entitlement to 
compensation after termination of employment, the most crucial 
issue of the lawsuit. When the jury retired to the jury room to 
commence their deliberations, they should have had these two 
excluded exhibits available to them, and the testimony of the 
witnesses regarding them well in mind, so that they could afford 
them the weight they deemed appropriate. The jury should have been 
allowed to know that these two documents were also part of "the 
totality of the circumstances11 they were called upon to consider 
in the case. The exclusion of these two documents creates a 
"reasonable likelihood" that the trial court's error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings. 
The trial court usurped the role of the jury by deeming these 
documents to be not relevant. The issues that could be raised 
with respect to them, such as they were not signed, or the buyouts 
contemplated thereby were never accomplished, go to the weight of 
the evidence, not their admissibility. As a result of the courtfs 
erroneous ruling, the jury simply did not have all of the relevant 
facts available to them to make a correct decision. Consequently, 
it is clear that this Court's confidence in the verdict should be 
undermined because of the reasonable likelihood that the trial 
court's error affected the outcome of this case. Accordingly, 
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Romney respectfully requests that the Court reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial, 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN TAXING 
COSTS AGAINST ROMNEY BECAUSE THE COURT TAXED 
AS "COSTS" TRAVEL EXPENSES REQUESTED BY FERRIN 
WHICH ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO BE TAXED AS COSTS 
UNDER UTAH CASE LAW OR BY STATUTE 
The trial court abused its discretion in taxing as "costs" 
the witness travel expenses claimed by Ferrin in his amended 
memorandum of costs. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) allows "costs . . 
. as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs." A trial court "can exercise reasonable discretion in 
regard to the allowance of costs," but still "has a duty to guard 
against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof." Frampton 
v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 (Utah 1980). 
"Costs" are defined as "those fees which are required to be 
paid to the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes 
authorize to be included in the judgment." Frampton, supra, at p. 
774; Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
Utah, the statutes authorize the following witness travel expenses 
to be to be taxed as costs for witnesses travelling from outside 
the state: 
(2) A witness attending from outside the state in a civil 
case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents per mile and 
is taxed for the distance actually and necessarily traveled 
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inside the state in going only. Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) 
(1992). 
In his amended memorandum of costs, Ferrin claimed $1,142.95 
of "costs" for the "travel expenses" of two out of state witnesses, 
Jim Vernes and Bruce Maclntire. The requested travel expenses 
included the following: 
Airfare: $591.88 (Jim Vernes Vancouver BC -
SLC return) 
Lodging: $ 77.50 (Jim Vernes) 
Taxi: $ 26.00 (Jim Vernes) 
Transportation: $248.00 (Bruce Maclntire) 
Food: $150.57 
Total: $1,142.95 
None of the foregoing "travel expenses" claimed for these two 
witnesses are authorized by Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2). Ferrin may 
have actually agreed to pay these amounts for Mr. Vernes and Mr. 
Maclntire, but they are not taxable as costs under Utah law. 
Romney raises no issue with respect to the other costs claimed by 
Ferrin in his amended memorandum of costs, which included a $125 
filing fee, a $4.50 service of process fee, and $501.40 for the 
taking of Romney!s deposition. 
Some of the same types of travel expenses claimed by Ferrin 
were rejected as "costs" by the Utah Court of Appeals in Morgan, 
supra, at p. 687. In that case, the court refused to allow as 
"costs," among other requested items, a "business meal" and "local 
travel" because they "are not provided for by statute." That 
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eliminates the "food" and "taxi" portions of Ferrin's request. 
Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) does permit the limited taxing of travel 
expenses, but at the rate of 25 cents per mile "traveled inside the 
state in going only." It does not, however, authorize "airfare," 
"lodging," or unspecified "transportation." Accordingly, the 
balance of Ferrin1s requested travel expenses are not taxable as 
costs either since they are not authorized by statute. For the 
foregoing reasons, Romney respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the decision of the trial court taxing Ferrin*s witness 
travel expenses as "costs" in the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Because both Romney's Exhibit 57 and 58 had a "tendency to 
make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence," the trial court erred in finding 
the two documents irrelevant. Moreover, the trial courtfs error 
in excluding the evidence was harmful and prejudicial to Romney 
since there is "a reasonable likelihood the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." Finally, the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding Ferrin1s witness travel expenses as "costs" 
because the "travel expenses" claimed by Ferrin are not authorized 
to be taxed as costs by statute or under current Utah case law. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Romney respectfully requests that 
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the Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this 
case for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / * day of August, 1993. 
yk^WY '. fT)j2-*L^ 
David L. Blackner 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Exhibit "A" 
57 
A Right. 
Q So KRA is eligible to receive its fee beginning 
June 1, 1990; isn't that right? 
MR. SMITH: This is, again, argument. He has 
admitted that's what the words are. They're very clear. 
THE COURT: The document has been admitted, the 
document speaks for itself, and the question has been 
asked and answered. The objection is sustained. Let's 
move along. 
Q (BY MR. BLACKNER) Okay, Mr. Ferrin. You 
testified yesterday that the reason you left KRA is 
because you couldn't work out a deal with Mr. Romney on 
the purchase of KRA; is that right? 
A I couldn't work out one acceptable to him. 
Q So you had been negotiating, or attempting to 
negotiate one, anyway; isn't that right? 
A For several years. 
Q And in connection with some of those, or in 
connection with those efforts, you had committed some of 
your ideas to writing; isn't that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, the first proposal that you wrote to Mr. 
Romney was prepared in February of 1989. Do you recall 
doing that? 
A I don't remember the exact date. 
Dtf 
something 
It's your 
number 6. 
MR. BLACKNER: Counsel, this is, again, this is 
that's been 
book number 
THE 
MR. 
but I assume . 
have any 
3. 
sorry• 
proposed 
admitted 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
SMITH: 
It is. 
identified in both sets of exhibits. 
3, tab number 3, it's ours tab 
Is this Exhibit Number 3? 
Yes, it is. Well, I need to see it, 1 
BLACKNER: This is trial Exhibit 51, but— 
COURT: What other exhibits, counsel, that J 
relevance? What exhibit number is this? 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
SMITH: This is number 3. 
BLACKNER: It's number 51. 
SMITH: It's already been marked as number 
BLACKNER: It's already been entered, I'm 
SMITH: 
COURT: 
Exhibit 3? 
MR. 
THE 
SMITH: 
COURT: 
at this time 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
It's been marked. 
It has not been received. Is this 
That is correct. 
And are you asking to have it 
? 1 
BLACKNER: Yes, I am. 
COURT: 
SMITH: 
Any objection to 3 being admitt* ? 
Yes, I do, Your Honor, on the ba s 
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that it has entirely no relevance to any issue before the 
court here. This is negotiations for a buyout, it doesn't 
speak to compensation. If they remain employed, it 
doesn't speak to any issue here. It doesn't even speak to 
the counterclaims. 
THE COURT: All right, I'm not admitting it at 
this time. You may proceed with your line of questioning, 
we'll see where we end up. 
MR. BLACKNER: Your Honor, can I present a 
counterargument with respect to what Mr. Smith has said? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BLACKNER: Okay. He's represented that it 
doesn't speak to compensation. And if you'll look— 
THE COURT: Just a moment, either we're at the 
side bar or we're not, and if we are then we're going to 
allow also counsel to be present. Please approach, both 
of you. 
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of 
the j ury.) 
THE COURT: I'll reserve a ruling on 3. Let's 
move forward. 
Q (BY MR. BLACKNER) Pending the ruling I'll just 
move on to a different subject matter. Yesterday we 
talked to some extent about the Doral contract, which is 
Exhibit 1. Do you recall doing that, Mr. Ferrin? 
8 2 
TUESDAY, JANUARY 2 6 , 1 9 3 ; P.M. SESSION 
P A R T I A L T R I A L P R O C E E D I N G S 
(The following record was reported by me, 
Suzanne Warnick, a substitute reporter, in the absence of 
the on-going reporter in order to handle a motion outside 
the presence of the jury during the noontime recess.) 
THE COURT: We are on the record in the matter 
of Ferrin v. Romney, that's Case No. 894902584 — and I'll 
indicate for the record, I think I just read the wrong 
number into the file. I'll correct that in a moment. 
What I will indicate is that counsel is present, 
the jury is out at the moment, and there are two issues 
that counsel wanted to discuss with the Court in the 
absence of the jury. And the correct number on this I 
will read into the record in a moment. 
You may proceed, counsel. 
MR. BLACKNER: The purpose for which we are 
having this on the record is whether or not there will be 
allowed into evidence two documents relating to the 
proposed buyout of KRA by Mr. Ferrin. 
THE COURT: Your position as to relevancy is 
what, counsel? 
MR. BLACKNER: Our position is that these \re 
key relevant documents. 
THE COURT: How are they relevant? 
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MR. BLACKNER: They are relevant because both of 
them refer to compensation. If I can quote you the direct 
language in each of them, in the first document, the 
document dated February 18, 1989, in paragraph 7, the last 
sentence of that paragraph says, 
"If KBR leaves KRA on his own or is terminated, 
the above mentioned 25 percent payment shall 
cease." 
We believe that's relevant because it shows — 
remember the plaintiff is alleging that he is entitled to 
money after he leaves, although he has no written 
agreement. And even Mr. Romney — he didn't even say Mr. 
Romney discussed it. This shows what was the attitude of 
the parties, and certainly the plaintiff, with respect to, 
if not their own agreement, evidence of certainly what he 
felt was reasonable if someone leaves, he wasn't going to 
pay them, continue to pay them. 
THE COURT: When you say what he thought was 
relevant, who are you talking about? 
MR. BLACKNER: I am referring to the plaintiff, 
Mr. Ferrin. 
THE COURT: All right. And I understand, Mr. 
Smith, that you still are opposed to the introduction of 
this Exhibit; is that correct? 
MR. SMITH: That is correct, your Honor. I want 
nrxutTmrn-n-n -r r 
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the record to reflect that, though it was listed as a 
proposed exhibit on our part because there are parts of it 
that can be used for exactly the opposite conclusion, I 
concluded that it was obviously an irrelevant document. 
It was essentially a different set of facts, different 
purposes for the issue to be resolved there. What they do 
in one circumstance has no bearing on what they would do 
in another circumstance. 
THE COURT: What I would suggest is, move 
forward, it seems. Arguably it might be relevant to the 
issue of compensation. I am not willing to make a ruling 
prior to any specific questions being asked. 
In looking at it, there do appear to be certain 
portions that may need to be redacted that are not 
relevant to this case, even if the totality of it appears 
relevant. So we711 proceed on a question by answer basis. 
I am not ruling on its admissibility at this point. But I 
am going to allow you to start to get into the area and 
we711 see where we go with it. 
With that in mind, is there anything further 
before we bring in the jury? 
MR. BLACKNER: Would you like to address the 
second document now, too? 
MR. SMITH: What second document? 
THE COURT: What second document? 
nrwjmTirrvciTiTrrTPTi i r m T\ XT c? r>T> T D«T» 
1 MR. BLACKNER: There are two buyout agreements. 
2 One is dated February 18, 1989. 
3 THE COURT: Where would that be, counsel? I 
4 have one that says March 1 of '89. 
5 MR. BLACKNER: This again was listed by both 
6 parties. 
7 THE COURT: Where would it be in my packet of 
8 Exhibits? 
9 MR. BLACKNER: I have a copy of it here for you. 
10 MR. SMITH: Is it this, No. 9? 
11 It's No. 9 in the Tab No. 9. 
12 THE COURT: So you don't have any objection to 
13 this one? 
14 MR. SMITH: No. I have the same objection. I 
15 do not intend to use it myself. Let me state that again. 
16 It isn't a matter — and I don't mean to come 
17 back around to it — but it is not a matter of portions of 
18 it being relevant. This is negotiations on an entirely 
19 different subject matter. It's like saying, Well, Gee, he 
20 I went one day and bought a car and said, We'll defer 
21 payments. And therefore, that's relevant to this issue. 
22 I He went to try and buy Mr. Romney's business. 
23 It had nothing whatsoever to do with his employment with 
24 Keith Romney. Why don't we bring in his — maybe he has 
25 sold a house in this same time frame and we talked about 
POMPTTTFRTZED TRANSCRIPT 
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deferred payments; maybe he bought a car, maybe he did a 
dozen things, 
THE COURT: All right. I understand your 
position. 
Mr. Blackner, tell me specifically what in this 
agreement goes to issues before us in this case. 
MR. BLACKNER: Okay. Now, to the extent Mr. 
Smith's arguments have merit with respect to the first 
document we have talked about, they clearly don't with 
respect to this one. 
THE COURT: My question of you is simple. What 
is relevant in this agreement that you have now handed me? 
MR. BLACKNER: Look on the last page of the 
document. You'll see that just the page prior there is a 
heading, Purchase Option and Employment Agreement. Then 
you'll see on the last page there is an entry, 
"KBR and BAF agree to the following reemployment 
agreement of BAF: One, until BAF purchases, KRA 
is terminated. KBR agrees to pay BAF an amount 
of 25 percent income received by d/b/a less 
unreimbursed business consultation expenses (the 
same method of determined used to date)." 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, Mr. Blackner v,9ll knows 
that — he took the deposition of Mr. Ferrin, anc Mr. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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Ferrin indicated at that time that this wasn't even in our 
document list. 
MR. BRENT FERRIN: This wasn't even his 
document. 
MR. SMITH: He didn't draft this document. This 
is a part of a negotiation. 
MR. BRENT FERRIN: No, no, no. This one. 
THE COURT: Just a moment. Let me ask this: 
Who allegedly prepared this document? 
MR. BLACKNER: That's been covered in the 
deposition. 
THE COURT: I am asking, counsel, who allegedly 
prepared this document? 
MR. BLACKNER: This document was prepared by Mr. 
Ferrin's attorney with his input. His attorney didn't 
know what the agreement had been to date. Someone had to 
tell him. 
THE COURT: What attorney? 
MR. SMITH: Yeah. I believe— I guess I am 
going to have to go out and get the deposition testimony, 
but this is what I recall, your Honor. Mr. Ferrin said 
this was a draft of a document that had been prepared by 
his lawyer. He never accepted it. It was never approved 
by anyone. He did not approve of that language, had told 
his lawyer to change that language. It just never got 
88 
done because the negotiations stopped between them. 
This was an attempt by Mr. Romney and Mr. Ferrin 
to renegotiate their entire deal. It never went through, 
and this isn't Mr. Ferrin's language; this is a lawyer. 
That was a draft proposal that was never used for any 
purpose whatsoever. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blackner, anything further on 
this point? 
MR. BLACKNER: I completely disagree with that 
representation. I covered this in the deposition. I 
asked him, Did you prepare this with your attorney? Did 
you provide the input? And the answer was, Yes. Did you 
submit this to Mr. Romney? Yes. 
THE COURT: How is it relevant? 
MR. BLACKNER: It's key. 
THE COURT: We are not talking about this 
agreement. We are not talking about an anticipated 
agreement that may or may not have been entered by the 
parties. We are talking about a specific compensation 
agreement that is not covered in this document. 
MR. BLACKNER: Okay. I'll accept that at face 
value. But in that one parenthetical expression, "(the 
same method of determination used to date)," that's an 
expression of what the agreement was. That's key 
evidence. 
COMPUTET7FH TPAWSPPTPT 
b9 
THE COURT: All right. My ruling at this point 
is that you may ask the witness whether his understanding 
of compensation was consistent with this agreement that 
was never entered into if you wish to. The agreement, 
itself, I perceive to be irrelevant and I am not going to 
allow its use as an exhibit at this point, absent further 
showing of relevancy. 
You can certainly ask him if there is anything 
in this now that he is familiar with the same that changes 
his understanding, and he can answer whatever the reality 
is. 
Let's bring the jury in. 
(This concludes the record made at this time 
outside the presence of the jury. The proceedings were 
continued, as per the record of the regular reporter.) 
*** 
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57. Can you identify that document for us, please? 
A Yes. 
Q Could you please tell us what it is? 
A It's handwritten notes of an outline to buy out 
Keith Romney Associates by me. 
Q Is this a document that you created? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that your handwriting? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Did you create it on or about the date 
indicated, February 18th, 1989? 
A I don't know. The date at the top appears to 
be a little out of place, but apparently it could be 
February 18th, '89. 
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, may we approach? I'm 
confused about something. 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of 
the jury.) 
THE COURT: Next question, please, Mr. Blackner. 
Q (BY MR. BLACKNER) Mr. Ferrin, did you make a 
buyout offer to KRA in February of '89? 
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, objection. It's 
irrelevant. 
MR. BLACKNER: I'm not referring to the exnibit. 
r*r\Mrr>TimT?'n-rr7'E*T\ r r m * vroi~n->-TTim 
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MR. SMITH: But the subject matter of the 
document has been deemed irrelevant, unless he's going to 
use it for some sort of impeachment purposes, and that's 
not the way to do it. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
Q (BY MR. BLACKNER) Mr. Ferrin, in connection 
with an offer you made to buy out KRA, did you make it a 
part of that offer that if Mr. Romney were to leave— 
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I'm going to have to 
interrupt, because it's simply irrelevant. It's not 
information that has anything to do with this, and he's 
going to get it before the jury by stating the answer in 
the question. 
THE COURT: All right, the buyout agreement is 
irrelevant, counsel. The objection is sustained. 
MR. BLACKNER: Is that— 
THE COURT: That's my ruling, Mr. Blackner. 
It's consistent with my ruling earlier on the record. 
Let's move along. 
MR. BLACKNER: Your Honor, may we approach? 
THE COURT: Next question, please. 
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I know this is a little 
out of order, but I see that the witness has been handed 
another document which the court has already ruled is 
irrelevant to these issues. It talks about the buyout 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSPPTPT 
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Exhibit "c" 
AGREEMENT 
Agreement made this day of February, 1990 between 
Keith B. Romney of 1146 Gilmer Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah herein 
referred to as seller and Brent A. Ferrin of 126 West Bayview 
Drive, Farmington, Utah herein referred to as buyer. 
The parties recite and declare: 
1. Seller now owns and conducts a business under the firm name 
of Keith Romney Associates at 134 South Main, Salt-Lake City, Utah. 
2. Seller desires to sell and buyer desires to buy such business 
for the price and on the terms and conditions hereinafter set 
forth. 
For the reasons set forth above and in consideration of the 
mutual covenants and promises of the parties hereto, seller and 
buyer covenant and agree: 
SECTION ONE 
SALE OF BUSINESS 
Seller shall sell to buyer, free from all liabilities and 
encumbrances, seller's above described business and all other 
assets thereof as hereafter listed and as more specifically set 
forth and enumerated in the schedule annexed hereto, entitled 
Exhibit A, and made a part hereof by this reference as though fully 
set forth. 
SECTION TWO 
CONSIDERATION 
In consideration for the transfer of the above described 
business from seller to buyer, buyer shall pay to seller the sum 
of one million dollars ($1,000,000) , which seller shall accept 
from buyer in full payment therefor, subject to the terms and 
conditions herein contained. 
SECTION THREE 
ALLOCATION OF PURCHASE PRICE 
The purchase price of one million dollars ($1,000,000) shall 
be allocated to the various assets of the business as follows: 
Equipment, furniture, and fixtures: $10,000 
Good will: $10,000 
Notes and accounts receivable: $250,000 
Consulting services: $730,000 
1 
10267 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
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SECTION FOUR 
TIME AND MANNER OF PAYMENT 
Date of closing will be thirty (30) days after gross income 
of the business reach $750,000 for any calendar year, or any time 
thereafter at the sole option of buyer. 
The purchase price shall be paid as follows: 
(a) A down payment of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in cash 
upon the closing date of this agreement, 
(b) Consulting fees of $150,000 per year payable in monthly 
installments on the fifteenth day of each month, commencing thirty 
days after the closing date referred to herein or an annual amount 
equal to thirty percent (30%) of the gross income of the business, 
whichever is greater, until the entire balance is paid in full. 
Such payments shall apply only if annual gross receipts of the 
business shall amount to $500,000 or more. If in any year there 
shall be less than enough gross, income so that 30% would not 
discharge these obligations then seller shall receive 50% of gross 
profits. 
SECTION FIVE 
SELLER CONSULTING RESPONSIBILITIES 
Seller agrees that he will dedicate his full time and effort 
as a consultant to the business for at least 5 years from the date 
of closing. After the initial 5 year period, buyer, at his sole 
discretion, may elect to retain seller's services on a mutually 
agreeable consulting fee basis thereafter. 
SECTION SIX 
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE 
Seller shall not participate in any way, directly or 
indirectly, in a business similar to that herein sold to buyer for 
a term of ten (10) years from the date of closing. 
SECTION SEVEN 
DEATH OF SELLER 
Upon the death of the seller, any and all payments or 
obligations due seller under this agreement shall cease. Any 
claims by heirs or representatives of seller's estate shall be 
fully satisfied upon payment of $1 by the buyer to the estate of 
the seller. Said payment shall be made within thirty (30) days 
following the death of the seller. 
2 
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SECTION FOURTEEN 
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
In case of claim of breach of contract by either party, the 
party so claiming shall notify the other party in writing, 
indicating the alleged breach and the amount of damages claimed 
therefor. In case of dispute as to the existence of a breach, or 
the amount of damages therefor, the parties shall submit the 
dispute to a mutually acceptable three member board composed of 
active arbitrators of the American Arbitration Association located 
in the state of Utah. The decision of the arbitration board shall 
be final where unanimous, but either dissatisfied with decision of 
the arbitration board which is less than final shall have customary 
recourse to the judicial system of the State of Utah. Where 
damages for a claimed breach shall be assented to, or confirmed by 
a unanimous determination of the arbitration board, such damages 
shall be paid solely from the income generated by operation of the 
business. 
SECTION FIFTEEN 
BINDING EFFECT 
This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, personal 
representatives, and assigns of the parties hereto. 
In witness whereof, the parties have executed this agreement 
at Salt Lake City, Utah the day and year first above written. 
Keith B. Romney Brent: A. Ferrin 
^0270 
Purchase Option And Employment Agreement 
Keith B. Romney (KBR) and Brent A. Ferrin (BAF) agree to 
the following re: Purchase Option of Keith Romney 
Associates (KRA): 
1. Purchase price shall be determined by taking the 
gross income of KRA from monthly incremental payments 
received by KRA during the period from February 1, 1990 
to February 28, 1990 times twelve (12). (ie. if ten 
clients pay monthly incrementals of $10,000.00 each for 
a total of $100,000.00 during the month of February then 
the purchase price shall be $1,200,000.00 or 100000 X 
12.) 
2. If KBR shall receive a bonafide and verifiable offer 
to purchase KRA before March 1, 1990 then BAF shall have 
the option to match the offered price or in other words 
first right of refusal. 
3. If BAF decides that for whatever reason he is unable 
to purchase KRA on March 1, 1990 then he shall have 
additional options which may be exercised every six 
months thereafter for a period of two years * or four 
blocks of six months each at a price of twelve (12) 
times the previous six months average of monthly 
incremental payments received by KRA. 
4. BAF agrees that at the time of consummated purchase 
he will commit to pay KBR monthly payments on the first 
day of each month for a period of five (5) years an 
amount to fully amortize said purchase price at an 
interest rate of ten (10) percent or to pay cash for the 
remaining balance at any time with no prepayment 
penalty. 
5. KBR agrees to work full-time for KRA during the pay 
out period at the request and sole discretion of BAF. 
6. KBR agrees that before a purchase of KRA is 
consummated he will upgrade KRA in the following manner: 
a) Hire sufficient qualified professional and 
staff personnel to service the needs of KRA's 
clients. 
b) Obtain adequate computer hardware and software, 
which shall include at least two PCs with a letter 
quality printer and word perfect 5.0 software. 
c) Negotiate and qualify for a reasonable long-term 
lease in prestigious office space. 
d) Acquire a copy machine and a fax machine for 
office use. 
e) Produce and print a reasonable amount of quality 
brochures on KRA and its accomplishments. 
f) Obtain an American Express corporate credit 
card. 
KBR and BAF agree to the following re: Employment 
Agreement of BAF: 
1. Until BAF purchases KRA or is terminated, KBR agrees 
to pay BAF an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%) 
of all income received by KRA less any unreimbursed 
business cultivation expenses (the same method of 
determination used to date*). 
2. BAF will be an independent contractor, and as such 
shall be responsible for all personal income taxes, 
parking fees, health insurance expenses, etc. 
3. KBR agrees to reimburse BAF for all required company 
travel and attendant expenses, which are documented, 
within 15 days from date of submission. 
Keith B.Romney Brent A. Ferrin date 
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Exhibit "D" 
DUANE R. SMITH (2996) 
CRAIG G. ADAMSON (0024) 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-63 8 3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
BRENT A. FERRIN, : MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : Civil No. 910900418 
KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY & 
ASSOCIATES, : 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DUANE R. SMITH, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
states: 
1. That he is counsel for Plaintiff in the above-
referenced action. 
2. That Plaintiff was the prevailing party at trial 
having received a judgment in the sum of $102,681.42, together with 
interests and costs. 
3. That the following costs were reasonably and 
necessarily incurred in connection with the bringing prosecution 
of the above-entitled action: 
no0703 
JL 
Filing Fee: 
Service of Process Fee: 
Cost of Deposition of 
Plaintiff: 
Travel Expenses of 
Jim Vernes and 
Bruce Mclntire: 
TOTAL 
$ 125.00 
$ 4.50 
$ 501.40 
$1,142.95 
$1,773.85 
DATED this / y / day of February/ 1993. 
JANE R. SMH?H 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
~r<Jr. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /&jf day of 
^anikucy, 1993. 
My Commission Expires: 
•t " J'/ » r — - -n - ,CJ j 
)TARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum of Costs was served on the following individual by 
placing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid, this 
/^f day of February, 1993. 
David L. Blackner 
Kearns Building Mezzanine 
134 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
0007^3 
David L. Blackner, No. 5376 
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID L. BLACKNER 
Attorney for Defendant 
Kearns Building Mezzanine 
134 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 3 4 8 0 
£ iTMNotf^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT A. FERRIN, 
Plaintiff , 
vs. 
KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually 
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY & 
ASSOCIATES, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO HAVE 
COSTS TAXED BY THE COURT 
Civil No. 910900418 
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), defendant and counterclaim 
plaintiff Keith B. Romney objects to the memorandum of costs (the 
"Memorandum") submitted by plaintiff and counterclaim defendant 
Brent A. Ferrin ("Ferrin") in this matter and respectfully moves 
the Court to tax only those costs allowed under Utah law. 
DATED this V day of February, 1993. 
1 X ¥-
fcptsUsS* f ^ £2~^~^z_ 
David L. Blackner 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
In his memorandum of costs, Ferrin has claimed as "costs" 
certain expenses incurred in the course of this litigation which 
are not properly taxable as "costs" under Utah law. The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined "costs" to mean only: 
"those fees which are required to be paid to the 
court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes 
authorize to be included in the judgment. There is a 
distinction to be understood between the legitimate and 
taxable 'costs' and other 'expenses,' of litigation which 
may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable 
as costs." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 
1980). 
Although a trial court is allowed to exercise reasonable discretion 
in regard to the allowance of costs, the court still "has a duty 
to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof." 
Frampton, supra, at pp. 773-774. 
Construing this holding, the Court of Appeals has held 
that "witness fees, travel expenses, and service of process 
expenses are chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule 
set by statute." Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). In addition, the Court of Appeals has fur her stated 
that the "[c]osts of depositions also are not recoverat * unless 
'the trial court is persuaded that they were taken in gi d raith 
and, in light of the circumstances, appeared to be esse; ial for 
the development and presentation of the case." Morgan, supra, at 
-2-
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p. 687; Ames v. Maas, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 51 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). The Court of Appeals has specifically disallowed as "costs" 
appraisal fees, copying costs, word processing charges, courier 
charges, local travel expenses, litigation support, and business 
meals. Morgan, supra, at p. 687. 
In the memorandum of costs filed with the Court, Ferrin 
seeks reimbursement of the following costs: 
Filing Fee: $125.00 
Service of Process Fee: $4.50 
Cost of Deposition of 
Plaintiff: $501.40 
Travel Expenses of 
Jim Vernes and 
Bruce Mclntire: $1,142.95 
TOTAL: $1,773.85 
Romney has no quarrel with either the filing fee of $125 or the 
service of process fee of $4.50. He does, however, have a problem 
with the "deposition of plaintiff" and the unspecified "travel 
expenses" of Mr. Vernes and Mr. Mclntire, each of whom appeared 
voluntarily for Ferrin and traveled from outside the state. 
First, with respect to the "deposition of plaintiff," 
Ferrin is. the plaintiff and did not schedule and take his own 
deposition in this matter, he took Romney1s deposition. Romney 
scheduled and has already paid for plaintifffs deposition. Perhaps 
Ferrin intended to indicate "deposition of defendant" and this cost 
entry is a typographical error. However, the rather high cost of 
$501.40 suggests that Ferrin does mean the [copy] cost of his own 
deposition since Ferrin's deposition took place over two days 
whereas Romney1s deposition was completed in one day. Romney 
objects to being asked to pay twice for plaintiff's deposition and 
for that reason requests that the Court disallow the $501.40 
claimed by Ferrin. 
Romney also objects to the unspecified "travel expenses" 
for Mr. Vernes and Mr. Mclntire, both of whom appeared voluntarily 
on behalf of Ferrin. Romney has no idea what the claimed $1,142.95 
figure is comprised of. Regardless of what the figure includes, 
however, the statutes are very specific on what an out of state 
witness in a civil case in Utah is entitled to receive. Utah Code 
Ann. 21-5-4(2) specifically provides as follows: 
A witness attending from outside the state in a civil 
case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents per mile and 
is taxed for the distance actually and necessarily traveled 
inside the state in going only. Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) 
(Supp. 1992). 
Out of state witnesses are not entitled by statute to airfare, 
hotel charges, meals, taxi cab fares, or whatever else the claimed 
$1,142.95 may actually be comprised of. Ferrin may have agreed to 
pay these amounts for Mr. Vernes and Mr. Mclntire, but such 
expenses are not taxable as "costs" under Utah law. As set forth 
above, "witness fees, travel expenses, and service of process 
expenses are chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule 
set by statute." Morgan, supra, at pp. 686-687. Accordingly, 
Romney urges the Court to also disallow the $1,142.95 claimed by 
Ferrin for unspecified "travel expenses." 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 1993 
tOt^/Z^^y^ 
David L. Blackner 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~T day of February, 1993, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO HAVE COSTS TAXED BY COURT by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Duane R. Smith 
Craig G. Adamson 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
m)07i:> 
DUANE R. SMITH (2996) 
CRAIG G. ADAMSON (0024) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-63 83 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
BRENT A. FERRIN, : AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : Civil No. 910900418 
KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY & 
ASSOCIATES, : 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DUANE R. SMITH, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
states: 
1. That he is counsel for Plaintiff in the above-
referenced action. 
2. That Plaintiff was the prevailing party at trial 
having received a judgment in the sum of $102,681.42, together with 
interests and costs. 
3. That the following costs were reasonably and 
necessarily incurred in connection with the bringing and 
prosecution of the above-entitled action: 
? « » 4 - 5 
« ? * • « 
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Filing Fee: 
Service of Process Fee: 
Cost of Deposition of 
Defendant: 
Travel Expenses of 
Jim Vernes and 
Bruce Maclntire: 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$1, 
125, 
4. 
501. 
,142. 
.00 
.50 
.40 
,95 
TOTAL $1,773,85 
4. That the fee of $501.40 for the deposition of the 
Defendant is that which was actually incurred, a copy of the 
Statement of the Reporter is attached. 
5. That the witness expenses were actually paid and are 
comprised of the following: 
Airfare: 
Lodging: 
Taxi: 
Transportation: 
Food: 
$591.88 (Jim Vernes Vancouver BC -
SLC return) 
$ 77.50 (Jim Vernes) 
$ 26.00 (Jim Vernes) 
$248.00 (Bruce Maclntire) 
$150.57 
DATED this 
Total: $1,142,95 
// day of Februar 
SANE R. sMlTif 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
February, 1993. 
My Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum of Costs was served on the following individual by 
placing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid, this 
JV^ day of February, 1993. 
David L. Blackner 
Kearns Building Mezzanine 
134 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
000713 
DEPENDENT Ru ORTING SERVICE 
•bell Garcia 
i M. Calder 
0 Beneficial Life Tower 
South State Street 
Lake City. Utah 84111 
1)538-2333 
RECEIVED 
M 9 1992 
April 13. 1992 
T O :
 r^Duane E. Smltn 
Attorney at Lav 
310 Soutn Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utan 84101 
L 
: FEHRIM V8. ROMNEY 
Civil HO. 910900418 
position Of: KEITH B. ROMNEY 
fcen: Karen 3. 1992 
lslnal 4 1 - 156 pp 
tnblt - 7 pp 
r Diem: 
$390.00 
1.40 
110.00 
Invoiced 1082RCG 
tal: $501.40 •••••THANK YOU"***** 
)oner: Rashell Garcia 
1.0. #87-0430073 
' \A/~ 
. /*..v.r ,C,-«- f*-
[\Zl 
L_AW O F F I C E S O F 
DAVID L. BLACKNER rro 0 3 1993 
KEARNS BUILDING MEZZANINE l U D 
134 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 X"*t 
TELEPHONE (801 ) 521 -348CV,, ^ 
FAX (801 ) 524-0210 
February 12, 1993 
'JUL 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Brent A. Ferrin v. Keith B. Romney 
Civil No. 910900418 
Dear Judge Lewis: 
Enclosed is a courtesy copy of Romney's Objection to Entry of 
Proposed Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Have Costs Taxed by the 
Court. 
I have reviewed the changes made by Ferrinfs Amended 
Memorandum of Costs and the explanation thereof in Mr. Smith's 
letter to you of February 11, 1993. Based upon the changes made, 
Romney has no objection to the cost entry of $501.40 for 
"deposition of defendant," but reiterates his objection to any 
claimed costs and travel expenses for Mr. Vernes or Mr. Maclntire. 
Romney fs reasons for objecting to such costs are set out in his 
Rule 54(d)(2) Motion. 
Thank you very much for your attention to this matter. 
Si^r^erely, . 
• ^ . ^ > , 
David L. Blackner 
DLB/db 
cc: Duane R. 
Keith B. 
Smith, 
Romney 
Esq, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FERRIN, BRENT A 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
ROMNEY, KEITH B 
DBA KEITH ROMNEY ASS DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 910900418 CN 
DATE 02/23/93 
HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK EHM 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
THE COURT RECEIVED AND REVIEWED PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT ON THE 
VERDICT, AND THE OBJECTIONS TO THE SAME. 
THE COURT SIGNED THE JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT AS SUBMITTED 
BY PLAINTIFF WITH CHANGES INTERLINEATED BY THE COURT, AND 
AWARDING COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,773.85. 
000723 
Case No: 910900418 CN 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the / day of 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
DUANE R. SMITH DAVID L BLACKNER 
Atty for Plaintiff Atty for Defendant 
310 SOUTH MAIN STREET KEARNS BUILDING MEZZANINE 
SUITE 1330 134 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
District Court Clerk 
By : fj\MfAMJ~M&thMK> 
Deputy Clerk 
